Great Lessons About Secret Shenanigans: Kaesong and Korean Relations

Several sources reported today that the Kaesong joint manufacturing facility inside North Korea is no longer admitting South Korean skilled workers and managers. This is serious, however it is also important to note that Kaesong is still operating.

NK is allowing SK nationals to go home, but without replacements. Since there are no replacements, most are choosing to stay on shift which NK would have anticipated. Bottom line--This is a serious slap and a delaying tactic at the same time. NK isn't cutting into its income much yet--but if this continues long term they seriously risk that and more.

SK passage to Kaesong has been closed once before only to be reopened after SK/US joint military exercises concluded. If NK doesn't allow shift change by May, when the yearly US/SK military drills¹ are over, then we are in uncharted territory. Below, I will try to outline how this may play out.²

Basically the border closure is classic DPRK brinkmanship taken to a rare but not unheard of height. The thing about brinkmanship though is that if in each new situation you have to go closer to the brink to prove yourself or punish others, eventually your distance from the edge is enough within the margin of human error and hubris to make Zeno's Paradox irrelevant.

Because of the DPRK pattern of brinkmanship, it is likely that their intent is to back off before going over the precipice of all out war, but after perhaps a missile test launch and or a small scale physical attack on SK interests that are operating in a disputed area of the Yellow Sea during or after joint US/SK exercises. This sends a message that NK is not unconditionally accepting of the international powers that be, and that it will not bow to U.S. / SK ideology or influence or be persuaded by aid previously received. The border closure, and potential military action solidifies power internally, saves face after having accepted aid³, and acts as a point from which negotiations for further aid (such as recent medical aid from the South) can be bargained.

Bizarre? No. Just Quixotic. It makes sense from within DPRK governmental culture and policy. Similar brinkmanship has been used for decades in the DPRK's international relations. The country is impoverished, can't consistently feed its people, and has outdated conventional military equipment. Yet through all this, the Kim family has saved face and stayed in power with a strategy of managing a series of cycles of international escalation, negotiation, cessation, aid, and then moving back to escalation again while still managing to slowly develop missile and nuclear capabilities.

If SK chooses to stay out of disputed Yellow Sea areas during the exercises it may be possible to avoid NK military aggression this year, but not pursuing military drills in this area would also be an unusual step which would be seen as conceding or at least bending to the North's claim on the area. Refraining from holding at least some drills in disputed areas that the South controls is risky, politically unpopular, and very unlikely--especially considering the rhetoric of the current SK government. Result: As per usual, SK and possibly the U.S. holds military drills in disputed waters and on islets in the Yellow Sea this year.

So that avenue of aggression lies open to the DPRK again. If Kim Jong Un et al, decide to take it, they will likely do so at a time and place when U.S. forces are not close by to be directly threatened or threatening⁴. At that point, Pak's government in SK has pledged to retaliate against military targets (new development⁵)--and we have pledged to back them (also new--but type of backing not specified). Before, we backed against invasion, so the North could with less risk attack SK military assets in disputed areas without directly involving the U.S.

The nature of newly promised SK retaliation and DPRK's subsequent response to the SK response will likely determine whether the border crossing to Kaesong reopens and the status quo is maintained, or the region (with us backing SK) slips over the edge this time. My bet is still on pulling back from the all too familiar brink.

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1 I've been part of these drills before. The drills in general don't tend to really accomplish much other than to show solidarity, and give key people an opportunity to get to know each other. There is often a second round a little later in the summer too. Military presence in the Yellow Sea however, serves to protect commercial fishing rights and a small number of islet residents.

2 Even though you already probably know this, I have to warn you that even trained military predictive analysts (Which I may, or may not be.) quite often miss the boat. This is still my best guess with current open source data at present.

3 Saving face is culturally very important, and the idea of North Korean self-sufficient independence is basic to the DPRK philosophy (it is central to its written constitution) as well as the continuation of a series of deified hereditary leaders. Accepting aid given from perceived need or pity weakens both of these ideas. Cunningly taking supplies or receiving payment from corrupt imperialistic western powers and their SK puppets is more acceptable internally. Even if it is much less reliable and consistent, obtaining aid in a way that can be portrayed as seizure, coercion, or cunning saves face by making aid a fiat of accomplishment rather than an act of weakness or submission, and allows the continuation of power for those in charge.

4 There are instances DPRK forces have launched attacks directly on U.S. forces, but in most instances have confined aggression to SK interests only.

5 Question: Would returning fire in a combat situation satisfy Pak's commitment to retaliate? If Pak's government chooses to consider returned fire as retaliation, and a given attack allows an immediate exchange of fire, retaliation then potentially stops with military self defense. In this scenario nothing is new--this has happened in the past. (See border incidents link below.) If the attack does not allow immediate exchange of fire or the Pak government does not consider fire returned as truly a retaliatory deterrence to future attacks, then Pak is publicly committed to launching a retaliatory strike.

Articles which brought on this musing:

http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/04/world/asia/north-korea-blocks-workers-from-south-at-border.html?_r=0

http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2013/04/02/north-korea-south-us/2048335/

Other things to consider:

SK banks suffer cyber attack -- It is unclear who is behind this. DPRK was initially blamed, but the IP address of origin was inside a SK bank, not from China as originally believed--not that the origin IP address is necessarily an indicator of the origin of the attack.

North Korea's historic problem feeding its people.

http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/08/30/us-korea-north-food-idUSBRE87T08J20120830

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/North_Korean_famine